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Abstract
Heimdalisanindependentlydevelopedandfreeimplemen-
tation of the Kerberos5 protocol,unencumberedby US ex-
port restrictions. It is compatible with other implementa-
tions and is close to the MIT Kerberos 5 API. It includes
versions of common applications such as telnet, ftp, rsh,
su, and login. Furthermore, it has some new features not
available in other implementations, such as authenticated
and encrypted X connections, incremental database propa-
gation, and supportfor IPv6 and Triple DES
￿.T h e r ei sa l s o
support for operation in ﬁrewalled environments.
1 Introduction
Kerberos, developed primarily at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology (MIT), has become a popular security
system and is used by many universities and corporations
around the world. One big problem has been its legal sta-
tus. Because of restrictions employed by the United States
government, it is not possible to export the source with-
out ﬁrst going through a lot of bureaucracy and possibly
not even then. You can get a copy of the MIT Kerberos 5
implementation from sources outside of the US, but it is
unclear how it got there and if you can safely use it. On the
other hand, many vendorshave some version of Kerberos5
available to non-UScustomers, usually only in binary form
and without the ability to encrypt user data.
With Kerberos 4 the exportdilemma was solved by remov-
ing all cryptographicfunctions and the calls to them, to get
something that could be approved of export. To get some-
thing that was usable, Eric Young took the exported ver-
sion, called Bones, and replaced the missing pieces, call-
ing the new distribution eBones. Since then many different
people have been hacking on this, including the authors,
adding improvementsover time.
￿When this article is written, work to implement Triple DES in the
MIT Kerberos distribution is in progress.
This export trick has not been repeated with Kerberos 5,
partly because the MIT code just recently went out of beta,
and partly because nobody was willing to do the work.
Since Kerberos 4 is reaching the end of its useful lifetime,
we decided that we needed a replacement. A key require-
ment on a new system was that it could reasonably easy re-
placeanexistingKerberos4infrastructure. Thereforecom-
patibility with eBones has been high on the list of things to
implement. Support for a large number of systems, includ-
ing Cray vector machines, was also important for us.
After a short period of discussions about whether and how
to go about creating such a beast, we started writing the
code that would later become Heimdal. The result is an
independent reimplementation of Kerberos 5 (which has
proved helpful—we have discovered a number of errors
and inconsistencies with the original speciﬁcation) that is
available to people in all parts of the world.
2 What is Kerberos?
Kerberos is a system for authenticating users and services
on a network. It is built upon the assumption that the net-
work is “unsafe”. For example, data sent over the net-
work can be eavesdropped and altered, and addresses can
be faked. Therefore addresses cannot be used for authenti-
cation purposes.
Kerberosis a trustedthird-partyservice, meaningthat there
is a third party (the Kerberos server) that is trusted by all
the entities on the network (users and services, collectively
called principals). The principals each share a secret pass-
word (or key) with the Kerberos server and this enables
principals to verify that the messages from the Kerberos
server are authentic. Trusting the Kerberos server, users
andservicescanthenauthenticatethemselvesto eachother.
Forspeciﬁc detailsonthe protocolreferto otherdocuments
o nt h es u b j e c t[ 7 ,5 ,6 ,4 ] .2.1 The Kerberos server
The central function in a Kerberos environment is per-
formedby theKerberosserverthat keepsa copyofthe keys
of all principals. This function is sensitive, an attacker that
obtains a copy of a principal’s key can masquerade as that
principal. An attacker that obtains a copy of the server’s
own secret key can masquerade as any principal. Because
of this, it is vital to keep the Kerberos server from being
compromised.
The server is also a single point of failure. If it is unreach-
able, no users will be able to authenticate themselves. The
solution is to keep several copies of the database, the com-
mon way of doing this is with master-slave replication; all
changes are performed to the database at the master and
the database is then periodically copied to one or several
slaves.
3 Services
Included in the Heimdal distribution are the core Kerberos
applications, such as the Kerberos server, applications to
obtain and manipulate tickets (kinit, klist,a n dkdestroy),
and administration programs.
Also includedare kerberisedversionsof clients and servers
for the some network services: rsh, telnet, ftp, and pop.
These programsalso supportbackwardscompatibilitywith
Kerberos 4, One Time Password (OTP) [2], and old-style
address and password-based authentication.
3.1 X11
Another network service that is quite useful but has some
securityproblemsistheX11protocol[1]. Thisisaproblem
because access to an X11 server is mostly binary: either
you are allowed all the operations (including listening for
key presses) or none at all.
The mostcommonlyused authenticationmethodsarexhost
and xauth.
The problems with xhost are that authentication is done at
host granularity and that it trusts IP addresses. This only
makes it usable in environments where you trust the other
users of multi-users machines and where you have control
over the entire networking infrastructure. Needless to say
this is not often the case in any but the smallest networks,
and speciﬁcally not on the global Internet.
Using magic cookies with xauth solves the problems with
xhost, but it is not without problems itself. First it is more
cumbersome than the magical xhost + command. A
deeper problem is that it relies on the cookies being secret,
which is very difﬁcult to ensure given that they are sent in
the clear over the network when initiating an X11 session.
The correct way of solving this problem would be to im-
plement another authentication mechanism that uses Ker-
beros to authenticate the client and server. This has been
speciﬁed and implemented in X11R6 [11]. However, these
modiﬁcations are not well maintained, and have been slow
to propagate into the vendor releases of X11. Furthermore
they only solve the authentication of the initial connection;
having protection against someone modifying the stream
and against someone being able to read the trafﬁc are re-
quirements that are not addressed.
Oursolutionto this problemhasbeento implementauthen-
ticated X11-proxies (see ﬁgure 1). The client connects to a
local proxy on the same host that forwards the data over an
encrypted channel to another proxy on the server host that
then talks to the real X11 server. So the ﬁrst proxy looks
like an X11 server to the client and the second one like an
X11 client to the server. This is all quite similar to what
SSH [10] does.
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Figure 1: kx authentication
There have been a few problems with this setup. First, not
allvendorshavecompiledinsupportforusingUnixsockets
as a transport protocol in their X libraries (we prefer Unix
sockets since they give a slightly higher level of security
and are more efﬁcient). This is most common with large
machinesthat doesnot have anygraphicsconsole—suchas
Crays. Togetthistoworkwithsuchmachines,wehavehad
to implementsupportforusingTCPconnections—withap-
propriatesecurityprecautions. It shouldalso be pointedout
that since we bugged them about this, Cray has added sup-
port for Unix sockets in their libraries.
Another problem is software that does extra magic when
they operate on a local display. One example is the
SGI GL-extensions, that work ﬁne over a normal TCP-
connection, but when detecting a seemingly local display,
insists ontalkingdirectlytotheX-server. Forthisparticular
problem, there is a workaround that involves more magic.3.2 PAM, afskauthlib, SIA, etc
A practical problem of deploying Kerberos is getting the
required support into various system commands (like lo-
gin,a n dsu). Included in the Heimdal distribution are
generic versions of these programs that should work on
most systems. However, some systems’ versions of these
programshave special featuresor do weird magic. Further-
moreit would be more elegantwith a moredynamicway to
specify which authentication mechanisms should be used.
As usual, there are several different standards for doing
this.
￿ Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): developed
by Sun
￿ Security IntegrationArchitecture (SIA): developedby
Digital
￿ afskauthlib: a hack by SGI
PAM and SIA are generalways of conﬁguringdifferentau-
thentication modules and how these should be used by dif-
ferent programs. The third, however, is a very small but
useful hack in the SGI versions of login and xdm pro-
grams that is intended for adding AFS support. We use it
to implement Kerberos authentication in these programs.
PAM has been incorporated by Sun into Solaris and by an
independentgroupinto Linux. Digital Unix is (as far as we
know) the only system that uses SIA.
4 Implementation
4.1 Incremental database propagation
As we mentioned before, there are a number of reasons for
wanting to keep replicated Kerberos servers in a realm (a
realm is an administrative domain). The most important is
of course the added reliability. Load sharing can also be of
a practical importance if there is a very large number of re-
quests. If the realm is spread over a large geographic area,
reducing network trafﬁc can be another reason for keeping
several servers.
Any system that has a replicated database has to main-
tain some level of consistency between the different sites,
otherwise users get quite confused. It would be possible
to do this with some kind of distributed database, but be-
cause of the lack of freely available, light-weight, and se-
cure databases, Kerberos systems tend to use some ‘propri-
etary’ system. The common way is to propagate the whole
database once every certain amount of time (e.g. 1 hour).
This is not an optimal solution; the slave database could be
out of sync for this amount of time, and the propagation
process uses machine resources and network bandwidth,
making it impractical to have a very short propagation in-
terval.
We have addressed this problem by implementing incre-
mental propagation that will only send database changes
from the master to the slaves. This way, the changes
can also be transferred immediately, keeping the slave
databases more fresh. All changes to the database receive
an increasing version number and are written to a log on
the master. The propagation daemon tries to keep track of
the current version of all the slaves and will send out up-
dates as soon as they are applied to the master database.
The slaves also keep track of the last version number they
have seen and will request all modiﬁcations between this
version and the current one when they connect to the mas-
ter daemon. As a fall-back, if a slave falls too far behind,
the whole database will be sent.
4.2 The ASN.1 shop of horror
One of the major hassles with implementing Kerberos 5
turns out to be its use of ASN.1 [3]. ASN.1 is a sys-
tem for encoding structures so they can be sent over the
network to another, possibly architecturely quite different,
machine. While this is a sound thing, ASN.1 is overly
complex, which is made clear by the many bugs in the
encoding you have to be compatible with to successfully
inter-operate with other implementations.
We have chosen to do the ASN.1 support with the help of
a compiler that takes the Kerberos 5 ASN.1 speciﬁcation,
and producesa set of functionsto encode, decode, and oth-
erwise manipulate these structures. There are a few such
compilers available, but since we did not ﬁnd any of them
likeable enough, we decided to write our own. It does not
have support for the incredibly large number of constructs
available in ASN.1, it supports the small subset that is ac-
tually used in Kerberos 5, and also has a reasonably small
footprint.
4.3 Combating ﬁrewalls
Firewalls can be a big problem for Kerberos users. Since
Kerberos is not as commonplace as many other services,
most ﬁrewalls have the special ports used by Kerberos
turned off by default, so these will have to be speciﬁcally
opened if any packets are to get through. Another problem
is that Kerberos’ default mode is to use UDP as its trans-
port protocol and UDP is commonly regarded by ﬁrewall
advocates to be an insecure protocol.
To solve some of these problems, we have added support
for both TCP and HTTP as additional transport mecha-
nisms. The TCP support is compatible with the soon-to-be updated Kerberos RFC. The HTTP support was added
since we discoveredthatit canbe quite difﬁcultto convince
ﬁrewall administrators to open a new port in their ﬁrewall
—and very much so if you are just visiting a site. The
choice fell on HTTP since, in our experience, most sites do
permit access to the WWW, even if it is through a proxy.
4.4 Portability
Heimdalshould,in principle,beportableto anysystemthat
has:
￿ an ANSI/ISO C compiler (such as gcc)
￿ awk
￿ lex/ﬂex
￿ yacc/bison
￿ sh, make, sed, & c:o
￿ Posix libraries
￿ Berkeley sockets
￿ ndbm or Berkeley DB (required by the server)
The build process uses GNU Autoconf to identify the char-
acteristics of the system. More than 50 commonly missing
or broken functionsare included in a library and condition-
ally compiled if required on a particular platform.
Heimdal currently builds and runs on most versions of
Unix (AIX, NetBSD, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, Digital Unix,
HP-UX, Irix, Linux, Solaris, SunOS, Ultrix, Unicos, and
UXP/V) and some systems with Unix-like environments
(like Windows 95/NT with cygwin32).
5 Compatibility
We believe that Heimdal is protocol compatible with most
other implementations of Kerberos. It has been tested with
code from MIT, OSF, Cisco, and Microsoft.
6 Future work
Even if it today is possible to penetrate most ﬁrewalls, this
doesn’t always allow you access to Kerberised services. A
part of the security of Kerberos requires that the client’s
network addresses are encoded in the ticket, so the client
has to know all possible addresses that it may appear to
come from. When you have a ﬁrewall between the client
and server, the connectionwill often seem to emanate from
the ﬁrewall itself. Because of this the client will have to
knowtheaddresstheﬁrewalluses, andaddthatto thelistof
addresses put into the ticket. There might be more than one
such address. To complicate this, there isn’t an easy way
for the client to ﬁnd out which those addresses are (other
than via manual conﬁguration).
A possible workaround for this is for the Kerberos server
to emit address-less tickets—tickets that are valid from any
address. But since the purpose of putting the addresses in
the ticket in the ﬁrst place was to make it harder to steal a
ticket, this actually reduces the security. By including the
addresses of the ﬁrewall, this type of wild card tickets are
eliminated, but since all tickets issued to clients behind a
speciﬁc ﬁrewall will contain the same addresses, you make
the whole ﬁrewalled network look like one machine, thus
reducing security.
Thebest way ofaddressingthese problems,as well asother
ﬁrewall related issues, are still under discussion.
Heimdal is already portable to most Unix like systems, but
unfortunately, the world likes to use other operating sys-
tems too. We foresee that at least a port to Windows will
be done in the future. Other possible systems include the
Macintosh and VMS.
Support for public-key cryptographyin the initial authenti-
cation [8] and for cross-realm operation [9] are other items
being considered.
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8 Availability
Heimdal is freely available under a BSD-style license. See
http://www.pdc.kth.se/heimdal/.
9 Mythological background
Now this Cerberus had three heads of dogs, the
tail of a dragon, and on his back the heads of all
sorts of snakes.
— Pseudo-ApollodorusLibrary 2.5.12
Kerberos is a monster (or a dog, if you prefer the domesti-
cated version), that guards the exit from the Greek under-
world Hades (named after its ruler), preventing the spirits
from escaping.
Heimdal (also spelt Heimdall) is a god in the Nordic
mythology. He is a watchman on the bridge Bifrost thatleads to Asgard, the realm of the gods. Asgard is also the
location of Valhalla where the men who fall in combat are
taken after their death.
Heimdal’s duty is to stop any giants from entering Asgard,
andheis wellsuitedforthistasksinceherequireslesssleep
than a bird, and can see for many miles both by night and
by day; he can also hear the grass grow, as well as the wool
on the sheep’s back.
When the world is about to end, Heimdal will blow his
Gjallar horn calling the gods to the battle ﬁeld. In this bat-
tle, manyofthe godswillperish, buta newandbetterworld
will rise from the sea.
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